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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH SECURITY LAWS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE 
AND AMBIGUOUS, AND THEREFORE A CRIMINAL CONVICTION 
BASED ON THOSE LAWS VIOLATES MR. SHEPHERD'S RIGHT TO 
DUE PROCESS. 
The general rule is that securities do not need to be registered if the security 
or transaction meets one of the exemptions under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-14. The 
burden of proving an exemption under §61-1-14 only requires the Defendant to 
produce some evidence that he meets the statutory term of an exemption, which in 
this case involves the "non-public" offering exemption. After the Defendant 
produces some evidence that meets the statutory terms of the exception, thus 
properly raising the issue, the burden of proof remains with the prosecution that 
Defendant is subject to the requirements he is accused of violating. State v. 
Swenson. 838 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992). 
Under both the Federal and State Constitutions, a statute must define an 
offense "with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what 
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement." Greenwood v. North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Kolendeer v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1993)). If a 
criminal statute fails to clearly define what conduct is illegal, then it is void for 
vagueness. It is required that laws give a person of ordinary intelligence a 
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reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. 
Secondly, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must 
provide explicit standards for those who apply them. West Valley v. Streeter, 849 
P.2d 613, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408, U.S. 
104, 108-09 (1972)) (emphasis added). 
Defendant's convictions of Counts I and II are based on Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-14(2)(n), which is unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, conviction on those 
counts violates Defendant's right to due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I of the Utah 
Constitution. Section 61-1-14(2)(n) specifically provides that "any transactions not 
involving a public offering need not be registered." This statute, however, gives 
absolutely no guidance as to what constitutes a "public offering". In applying the 
above statute to the Defendant, the question that must be asked is whether or not 
the statute provides fair warning and gives a person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know whether his particular offering is considered a 
public or non-public offering. The States' own expert witness, Tony Taggert, 
testified that the statute did not provide a definition of a "non-public offering." (See 
R. 377 Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume I, page 243). Without an explicit standard or 
any type of definition as to what is a "non-public offering", a person of ordinary 
intelligence, like the Defendant, is not given a reasonable opportunity to know what 
-2-
conduct is prohibited. When the State's own seenJiitip \pert testifier th;r \ 
Securities Act does not define a "non-public offering/' how then could it be 
expected that a person of ordinary intelligence would have a reasonable 
j 
Secondly, the statute must define an offense in a manner that doe-
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and in order to prevent such 
enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. West 
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policeman, judges, and jurie ' 
resolution on an ad hac basis with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application." ] d Without any definition or guidance provided by 
the stati ite as I :> diffei ei ice 1: €ti eei i It! iiiiiii nig t o 
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 
1136 (Utah 1992), the State appealed an order of the trial court dismissing criminal 
charges brought under the L.«... securities Act on the basis that the statute was 
vague and thereb m IIIIIII iconstitutn i ill lllliei ,HII v illli in i i im in pi in i I I HI illi Il I'll iili 
Uni form Securities Act, §§ 61 1 I to -30, or elsewhere wh ich define "publ ic 
offering." Nor could the court f ind definit ions of those terms in Utah case law. The 
j e q u a t e defjnjtior i • ::: f si iiiici i 11: EM i i is, it could not properly 
instruct the jury as to then piop m in iiniri)1, hi ill I II I I IIIIIII ^ r . In 1 1 lh<il by 
-3-
employing the terms in section 61-1-14(2) without providing authoritative, readily 
available definitions of the terms, the legislature had failed to advise a reasonable 
person of the nature of the securities transactions which may not be effected 
without registration as an agent, with sufficient clarity to meet the specificity 
requirements of due process, under the United States and Utah Constitutions. ] d 
On appeal, the dismissal was upheld on other grounds and so the Court did not 
address the vagueness issue. 
A. The statute does not provide a definition as to "public" 
or "non-public" that would put a reasonable person on 
notice of what conduct is prohibited. 
Given Defendant's limited offering, a reasonable person would conclude that 
the offering was a non-public offering. The State repeatedly tries to misconstrue the 
offering as being "a broad and aggressive" offering. (See, Brief of Appellee, page 
20). However, the offering of stock in Northlake Industries was very limited, and 
was only offered to a small number of friends and family members of Wally Church 
and Byron Merrill. (R. 376, Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume II, page 455). The State 
tries to suggest in its brief that the Northlake stock offering was an unrestricted stock 
offering, but this is clearly incorrect and the State did not present evidence that the 
offering was unrestricted . Finally, there was no evidence presented by the State 
that any of the potential investors did not have access to material information, such 
as the company's financial status, and in fact, the evidence showed that the 
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potential investors were not concerned with such information, I Iliii I nl 
Appellant, pages 4-7). 
I !u- Mdip suggests that the Utah Securities Act defines the term "public 
n I'd MUM ' 11 II in I ill 11 in ill ill 1111 ill iii1 III ill II in in in ill in I II III1!1 I I in mi I Hi provides a 
general "catch all" definition for any term that is not specifically defined by ilu« /1 I 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-13(27) provides that any term not specifically defined in this 
section shall have "the meaning commonly accepted in the business community." 
B y 1 1 ' I i " i i mi in • I i l i n In I n mi in mi mi mi mi mi ml III S» I . i l l 1 l i i 
accepted meaning for "public offering" in the business community. Howev 
State was unable to provide any evidence as to how the phrase "public offering" is 
commonly defined by the business community, thereby informing a person in the 
Defendant's positi- ::: i i as tc II \- B t l i IE'SIII ill iiiiiis a :tioi is > ei e pi • ::: Il lib 
was offered by the State only involved seven purchasers, with a total aggregate 
amount of approximately $24,000.00. Even a reasonable person in the business 
ecu i ii i ii 11 lit} i i oi ild not be able to conclude that such a limited offering did not meet 
the exemption Im i III in iiiiiiiiiiiliii ' niliMim' 
B. Rule R177-14-2(n) of the Utah Administrative Code 
(1990) does not provide a definitive interpretation of 
"public offering". 
I ^ Appellee Brief that Rule \ 
of the Utah Administrative < ' :'•• M990) | i Ii i i I i id I h iln i» 
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interpretation of "public offering" so as to give an ordinary person a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, and defeating the vagueness problem1. 
(See Brief of Appellee page 23-24). In attempting to argue that R177-14-2(n) 
provides an adequate definition, the State sets forth that one of the requirements of 
the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (ULOE) is that the securities must be 
exempt by SEC Regulation D, Rule 505 or Rule 506. (See, Brief of Appellee, page 
23). However, it has been held that "the relevant SEC Rules, collectively known as 
Regulation D, do not purport to be a definitive interpretation of what constitutes a 
non-public offering. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 807 F.2d 1052, 1064 (Dist. of Columbia, 1986). 
Furthermore, the Utah limited offering exemption, like Regulation D for the Federal 
Rules, merely provides a safe harbor, and securities offerings not in compliance 
with Regulation D and ULOE may nonetheless be exempt from registration under 
the non-public offering exemption, id. 
There is no reference in the Securities Act that makes reference to the 
Administrative Rule R177-14-2(n) of the Utah Administrative Code (1990). As such, 
1
 The State had the opportunity to bring forth this administrative rule at trial but 
failed to do so. The state's reliance on this administrative rule should be overlooked, 
as the state has raised this for the first time on appeal. The trial judge specifically asked 
whether or not there was any administrative rules or regulations that defined a non-
public offering and the State offered no such reference to the Court at that time. The 
State's own expert witness testified that there were no rules or regulations that defined 
a non-public offering. (R.377 Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume I, page 243). 
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it is clearly unreasonable to assume that an ordin; dividual 
the administrative ruling, thereby providing guidance as to whether or not his 
offering is a non-public offering. In fact, the trial judge specifically asked whether or 
c 
offering and the State offered no i: 'i reference1 In \Uv < iiiiiil „il tlkit time II In » 
State's owi1 expert witness testified that there were no rules or regulations that 
defined a non-public offering. (R.377 Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume I, page 243). 
I mi I mi ii mi L I I in 11 mi I mi mi mi mi mi mi mi in mi in I mi mi mi in I mi mi mi I I in I in mi mi mi in mi I in mi i I mi mi mi mi in in i • i a i i v i
 ( I mi 11 mi 1 mi naware of 
any type of administrat ive rule that defines a "non-publ ic" offer : 
person in the shoes of the Defendant wou ld l ikewise not have any notice. 
Finally, the States reliance upon Greenwood v. North Salt Lake, 817 n nH 
8 Hi 111 I III, ii 11 II i Ill II Ill I II | jlll Ill 
administrative research undermines the vagueness attack is misplaced. The 
underly ing ordinance in Greenwood al lowed for an administrat ive review foi 
individuals w h o wanted to predetermine whether a certain dog w o u l d or wou ld 
violate III in ii lliiiiii iniii Il lm im llliiiiiii iiiiii In nil1, it i n i n II II lllliiii1 m liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii 111 ill i inn iiiiiii Il 
The Court upheld the consti tut ional i ty of the statute, and in do ing so stated that the 
Appellants failed to employ the available administrative remedy, wh i ch was referred 
to in lii'i1 ok l i iM i i i i In i l,n il ;,/ whether their dogs were subject to the ordinances'" 
restrin * " wui-.iwow 
expressly included reference to the administrative hearing which the Court held was 
vital in giving notice, i d at 817. Unlike Greenwood, there is no reference or 
mention of any type of possible administrative remedy that would be available to 
the Defendant in determining whether or not his limited offering was "a public 
offering". 
C. Even if it is determined that the statute is not vague as to 
the definition of a non-public offering, the Defendant 
met the exemption requirement of subsection (q). 
Even if this Court finds that the statute is not vague as to what constitutes a 
"non-public offering", defendant is entitle to have counts one and two overturned as 
no reasonable person could have reach a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant did not meet the exemption listed in § 61-1-14(2)(q), which provides an 
exemption where there are less than fifteen purchasers and the aggregate offering 
does not exceed $500,000.00 during any twelve consecutive months. There was 
only evidence of seven purchasers with a total aggregate amount of approximately 
$24,000.00, meeting both requirements of the statute. (See Brief of Appellant page 
11). Nowhere in Appellee's brief did they address this issue. The burden of proof 
that the exemption does not apply to the Defendant remains with the prosecution. 
State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1992). 
The statute in question gives absolutely no guidance as to what constitutes a 
"public offering". As such, the Defendant's convictions under Counts I and II utterly 
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fail to inform a person of ordinary intelligence that his or her conduct is illegal and 
therefore is void for vagueness. Alternatively, the convictions should be overturned 
based on the exemption of subsection (q), as the evidence that was offered by the 
State involved only seven purchasers of the total aggregate amount of approximately 
$24,000.00 clearly within the statutory requirements for the exemption. 
II. THE JURY WAS NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED WITH RESPECT TO 
THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OFFERING. 
The Jury was not property instructed with respect to the definitions of a 
public and private offering within the State of Utah, as there is absolutely no 
definition for public or private offering provided in the statute or in case law. 
Because the statute is so unclear and so non-definitive about what is not a public 
offering, allowing the Judge to come up with an instruction that differs from what is 
contained in the statute, and then to be able to charge criminally for that offense is 
unconstitutional. 
It is within the trial court's discretion to select between two accurate but 
different jury instructions. State v. Petersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1332 (Utah App.), cert 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1990). So long as the instruction given was 
appropriate, an appellate court need not consider whether the Defendant's 
proposed instruction might also have been proper. ]d. The inquiry therefore must 
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center on the jury instruction actually used and determine whether it accurately 
states the law. State v. Gal legos. 849 P.2d 586, 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial 
judge, by his own admission stated that the jury was not adequately instructed with 
respect to what is to be considered a public offering. (R.379, Transcript of 
Restitution Hearing, page 16). The instruction given to the jury encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement of the securities laws. In West Valley v. Streeter, 
849 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Granade v. City of Rockford. 408 
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)), it was held that "laws must provide explicit standards for 
those who apply them." ]d. (emphasis added). By instructing the jury that they 
"may consider any factor believed to be relevant to this issue," the instruction failed 
to provide an explicit standard for the jury. 
The State suggests that by instructing the jury that they may consider any 
factor which they believed to be relevant, including the manner in which the stock 
was offered and the size of the stock offering, the instruction appropriately stated 
the law in Utah. However, this is not accurate as there is no Utah case law or 
statute that provides such a definition. The State suggested that the instruction is 
supported by other jurisdictions which have held that the identification of various 
factors are helpful to the jury in determining whether the offering is a public offering 
or not. (See, Brief of Appellee, pages 27-28). However, the cases cited by the 
Appellee in support of its position, that the jury instruction was proper, do not limit 
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the factors to be considered to only the size and manner of the offering, as was 
done in this case. Along with considering the size and manner of the offering, other 
jurisdictions look at the number of units offered, the number of offerees, and their 
relationship to each other and to the issuer, and whether or not the offerees had an 
opportunity to learn the facts essential to their investment and judgment. Parker v. 
Broom, 820 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Circuit 1987). 
However, as stated above, the factors provided in other jurisdictions have not 
been adopted by statute or by case law here in Utah. The jury instruction given 
failed to provide explicit standards for the jury to apply in determining whether the 
offering was public or private, and therefore encouraged arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Because the statute is so unclear and so non-definitive 
about what is not a public offering, giving an instruction that differs from what is 
contained in the statute and charging criminally for that offense is unconstitutional. 
III. THE STATE FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING EACH ELEMENT 
SO THAT A REASONABLE PERSON COULD HAVE REACHED A VERDICT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE THAT 
WAS PRESENTED. 
The State failed to meet its burden of proving each element of each crime as 
to counts three through seven, which are based upon securities fraud. The State has 
the burden of proving all the elements of each crime to the extent that a finding can 
be made beyond a reasonable doubt as to each of the elements of each crime. See, 
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State v. Goddard. 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). In reviewing a 
challenge to a jury verdict for insufficiency of the evidence, all of the evidence is 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. The verdict wil l be reversed when 
the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable person could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Blubaugh, 904 
P.2d 688, 694 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The State suggests that the convictions of counts three through seven are 
based upon the indirect involvement by the Defendant with the offer of sale of the 
security by omitting to provide material information to a potential investor. (See, 
Brief of Appellee, page 29). The State incorrectly suggests that the Defendant's 
insufficiency claim is solely based upon the fact that the Defendant did not have 
any direct contact with the investors or his receipt of money of Northlake. i d . The 
State is correct in asserting that under the statute, any individual can be convicted of 
securities fraud for indirect involvement, however, this is only one of the elements. 
The State must also prove that the Defendant acted willfully or willfully omitted 
such material facts. The Statute provides: 
It is unlawful for any person , in connection with the offer, sale, or 
purchase of any security, directly or indirectly, to make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances 
under which they are made not misleading. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-1(2)0995). 
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The State suggests that the Defendant's convictions were based upon his 
indirect involvement as he allegedly omitted to provide information, thereby 
misleading the potential investors. (Brief of Appellee at pg. 29). However, the State 
fails to focus upon whether or not the Defendant had knowledge of any material 
misstatements or omissions, and therefore could not have acted willfully as required 
by the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21, requires that the Defendant "willfully" 
violate §61-1-1 in order to be convicted. The individuals, in question, purchased 
the stock without even talking to the Defendant. The Defendant had no idea what 
was communicated to the individuals by Mr. Church prior to their purchasing the 
stock, and as such, had no knowledge of any material misstatements or omissions, 
as specifically required by the statute. 
The State has suggested that what potential investors were told by Northlake 
created an incomplete and misleading impression of the company and that it is 
important for a potential investor to be told such significant information as whether 
the stock is registered, the company's financial status, what kind of risk exists in the 
company, area of industry, and whether the company's president is receiving 
money or loans from the company. (Brief of Appellee, page 10). The issue before 
us is whether or not the Defendant "willfully" omitted material information. The 
State must prove each element of each crime. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,543 
(Utah 1994). This means that the state was required to meet its burden in proving 
-13-
that the defendant acted willfully, that any information that was omitted was 
material, and that the omitted statements, in light of the circumstances, were 
necessary to make the statements that were made not misleading. Each one of these 
elements must be established separately as to each fraud count. Furthermore, they 
must be established so that a finding can be made beyond a reasonable doubt as to 
each element. ]d. 
As stated above, the Defendant had no knowledge of any material 
misstatements or omissions that were communicated to the potential investors. 
Furthermore, Mr. Church, the individual that had the direct communication with the 
potential investors, stated that he knew about the risks that were involved and that 
they were told to him prior to his investment. He also identified in the State 
questionnaire that he knew about the risk, he knew about the financial status of the 
company, he knew it was a long term sort of an investment, and that there was no 
liquidity in the company. If Mr. Church knew this information, there could not be a 
material omission as alleged. 
The State focuses on various facts that support their position that the 
Defendant failed to disclose material information to investors. (See, Brief of 
Appellee, page 30 -31). However, the State fails to focus upon Utah Code Ann. § 
61-1-21 which requires that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant acted willfully in his failure to disclose material information to the 
-14-
investor. The statute and laws on security fraud are being applied today in such a 
way that anybody could be guilty without any knowledge or mens rea as the statute 
specifically requires. The individuals in question, purchased the stock without even 
talking to the Defendant. The Defendant had no idea what was being 
communicated to the individuals by Mr. Church prior to their purchasing the stock, 
and as such, had no knowledge of any misstatements or omissions. Therefore, these 
convictions should be overturned as there was no evidence to support or establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant willfully omitted material 
information, in light of the circumstances, that made the statements to investors 
misleading. 
IV. THE COURT'S ALLOWANCE OF THE JURY TO ASK QUESTIONS 
VIOLATES THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE 
PROCESS, AS THE STATE, NOT THE JURY, HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF. 
The trial courts allowance of the jury to ask questions of the witnesses 
violated the Defendant's constitutional right of due process of law as guaranteed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Article I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The State, not the jury, has the burden of proof 
in a criminal trial. And by allowing the jury to ask questions of the witnesses, the 
lower court incorrectly allowed that burden of proof to be shifted from the State to 
the jury. 
-15-
A. DEFENDANT DID PRESERVE HIS CLAIM ABOUT JURY 
QUESTIONS BY OBJECTING IN A TIMELY AND 
SPECIFIC MANNER. 
The Defendant did properly preserve his claim of allowing the jury to ask 
questions of witnesses as the Judge was both notified of this error and was allowed 
an opportunity to correct it, but refused to do so. (See, R. 377 Transcript of Jury 
Volume 1, pages 287-288). "An issue is properly raised if it puts the judge on 
notice of the error and allows the court an opportunity to correct it." State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d., 358, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Appellate review of criminal 
cases require only that "some form of specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court wil l review such 
claim on appeal." State v. Range), 866 P.2d 607, 611 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting 
State v. lohnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989). The Court was clearly on 
notice that the Defendant objected to the process of allowing jurors to question the 
witnesses. (See, Brief of Appellee at 34). The Defendant specifically objected to the 
process of allowing jurors to ask questions, thereby preserving this issue for appeal. 
B. AN OPEN ENDED INVITATION TO THE JURORS TO 
ASK QUESTIONS OF WITNESSES VIOLATED THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DUE 
PROCESS. 
It has been held by the Utah Supreme Court that an open-ended invitation to 
the jurors to ask questions of witnesses is not approved and should not be allowed. 
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State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958). "This court does not wish to be 
understood that it approves the practice of a trial court inviting jurors to ask 
questions. This privilege should only be granted when in the sound discretion of 
the Court it appears that it will aid a jury in understanding some material issue 
involved in the case and ordinarily when some juror has indicated that he wishes 
such a point clarified." ] d at 105. 
The State misconstrues the issue by focusing upon the fact that trial courts 
have some discretion to permit juror questions, but ignoring the fact that in this 
case, the Judge granted an open-ended invitation to the jurors to ask questions of 
witnesses, which is contrary to Utah law. Defendant does not disagree with the 
proposition that a trial court does have some discretion in allowing jurors to ask 
, questions. The Court in State v. lohnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989), held that 
"while not encouraged, it is within the trial court's discretion to allow jurors to ask 
questions in court", k i at 1144-45. However, the State's reliance upon lohnson, 
is somewhat misplaced in this case where the jury was given an open-ended 
invitation to question witnesses. In lohnson, the issue involved a single incident of 
questioning by two juror members of one particular witness, not an open-ended 
invitation to the jurors to ask questions throughout the trial as in this case. In 
Martinez, the Supreme Court apparently did allow for some questioning by jurors, 
and left this up to the discretion of the trial court, however, it clearly did not allow 
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for an open invitation to the jurors to question witnesses, which is the issue that we 
are presented with in the case. 
Defendant's constitutional right of due process was violated as jurors were 
given an open-ended invitation to question witnesses, and in effect taking the 
burden of proof out of the hands of the State. 
V. DEFENDANT MADE OUT A PRIMA FACIA CASE OF GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION, THEREFORE, THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION RESTS 
UPON THE STATE TO COME FORWARD WITH A GENDER NEUTRAL 
EXPLANATION. 
Under Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny parties may not discriminate 
against potential jurors by exercising peremptory challenges solely on the basis of 
race or gender. Batson. 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1 712, 1 723 (1986); 
see also. I.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 138, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430(1994). The 
State is correct in applying the three part test that has been adopted by both the 
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court, by which a trial court 
should conduct a Batson analysis. "Once the opponent of a peremptory challenge 
has made out a prima facia case of racial (gender) discrimination, the burden of 
production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race neutral 
explanation. If a race neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then 
decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996). 
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The State is incorrect in its assumption that the Defendant failed to carry his 
burden under step one of the test. Under I.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, it has 
been held that the party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facia 
showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is 
required to explain the basis of the strike. In applying Batson, the Defendant is 
required to make a prima facia showing of gender discrimination. This was 
established at the trial court by the Defendant showing that the State used every one 
of its peremptory challenges to strike male jurors. (See, R. 377, Transcript of Jury 
Trial, Volume I, page 143, line 16 to page 144, line 5). By a showing of the 
Defendant that the State used every one of its peremptory challenges to strike a 
specific group, the Defendant clearly made out a prima facia case, thereby shifting 
the burden to the State to come forward with a gender neutral explanation. 
Furthermore, numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern of 
peremptory strikes by a defendant showing that his opponent has used a 
disproportionate number of his peremptory against a group, and thus establishing a 
prima facia case of discrimination. State v. Alverez, 872 P.2d 450, 457 (Utah 1994) 
(addl citation omitted). 
The trial court denied the Defendant's Motion to release the jury and impanel 
a new one, holding that there is no authority to support that the equal protection 
clause has been violated when peremptory challenges are used to strike white 
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males. (See, R. 376, Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume II, page 145, lines 12-15 and 
page 152, lines 6-10). But, in applying the test which the Utah Supreme Court has 
identified to establish a prima facia case of racial discrimination, the Defendant met 
the elements set forth in State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
All of the peremptory challenges were use to strike male jury members, and based 
upon their work experience, they were more likely to understand the potential risks 
involved by those purchasing the securities. Because the State used everyone of its 
peremptory challenges to strike a particular group and because of those potential 
jurors work experience and greater propensity to understand the risks involved in 
purchasing the securities in question, Defendant's constitutional rights were 
violated. Furthermore, the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it held that 
peremptory challenges based on gender is not a protected class, as I.E.B. v. 
Alabama, held that gender is indeed a protected class and under the equal 
protection clause, and peremptory challenges used to strike only male members of a 
potential jury is prohibited. The state had the burden to come forward with a 
sufficient gender neutral explanation for the strikes. 
CONCLUSION 
The statute in question gives absolutely no guidance as to what constitutes a 
"public offering". As such, the Defendant's convictions under Counts I and II utterly 
fail to inform a person of ordinary intelligence that his or her conduct is illegal and 
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therefore is void for vagueness. Because the statute is unconstitutionally vague, the 
convictions based on count I and II should be overturned. Alternatively, the 
convictions should be overturned based on the exemption of subsection (q), as the 
evidence that was offered by the State involved only seven purchasers of the total 
aggregate amount of approximately $24,000.00 clearly within the statutory 
requirements for the exemption. 
In addition, the jury was not properly instructed as to the definition of a "non-
public" offering. The jury instruction given failed to provide explicit standards for 
the jury to apply in determining whether the offering was public or private, and 
therefore encouraged arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Because the statute 
is so unclear and so non-definitive about what is not a public offering, giving an 
instruction that differs from what is contained in the statute and charging criminally 
for that offense is unconstitutional. 
Along with Counts one and two, the statute proving the definition of 
securities fraud is unconstitutionally vague. The statute and laws on securities fraud 
are so vague that it is impossible for a reasonable person to be able to understand 
them. They are being applied today in such a way that anybody could be guilty 
without any knowledge or mens rea as the statute specifically requires. The 
individuals purchased the stock without even talking to Mr. Shepherd. Mr. 
Shepherd had no idea what was being communicated to the individuals by Mr. 
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Church prior to their purchasing the stock, and as such, had no knowledge of any 
misstatements or omissions. Therefore, these convictions should also be 
overturned. 
Defendant's constitutional right of due process was violated as jurors were 
given an open-ended invitation to question witnesses, and in effect taking the 
burden of proof out of the hands of the State. Furthermore, the trial court abuse its 
discretion when it held that peremptory challenges based on gender does not fall 
within a protected class. As a result, convictions on all counts should be 
overturned. ft 
DATED this the T Z H d a y of April, 1999. 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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